Abstract-As systems become more complex and have longer lifespans, they will likely encounter contextual variation or be themselves subject to change. Systems need to not only be feasible but viable as well. That is, they need to be able to continue to provide value in spite of any potential exogenous or endogenous changes. Viability has been defined for other domains, but it has not been defined for engineered systems. This paper defines what it means for an engineered system to be viable and shows that it is related to, but different from, other existing "-ilities" such as survivability and reliability. This paper also addresses the need to ensure that endogenous changes do not inadvertently cause unintended interactions that harm the system overall. A new -ility, i.e., pliability, is introduced, which specifies the limits on how a system can change, without "breaking" or violating an architecture that was intended and validated. Like changeability, pliability increases robustness by allowing systems to voluntarily change in response to dynamic contexts and increases survivability by increasing the likelihood that unintentional changes are still within the set of allowable architecture-defined instances. It also distinguishes allowable changes from those that would require additional validation, reducing the effort required to get those changes approved by a diverse set of stakeholders.
A. Viability in Technical and Nontechnical Literature
Viability for organizations is defined in the management literature as "the survival or preservation of identity in a changing environment" [3] , whereas team viability has been defined as "a group's potential to retain its members" [4] . In biology, the viability of a population of organisms is the likelihood that the population will not go extinct [5] . In medicine, the term viability is typically used to estimate the likelihood that a fetus will be able to survive outside its mother's womb [6] . In the systems literature, which includes natural and artificial systems, Beer [7] developed the Viable System Model (VSM), to describe how a system can continue to exist and maintain its identity in a dynamic environment. The basis behind the VSM is that a system must satisfy Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety [8] , by maintaining adequate control mechanisms to cope with uncertainty in the environment, to be viable.
The definitions for viability above are similar in certain aspects and different in others. This is not surprising since the entities themselves (e.g., organizations, organisms, and natural systems) are similar in some aspects and different in others. In all of these definitions, viability refers to an entity's ability to exist over some period of time, in spite of change. However, the definitions differ in the aspect of identity, independence, self-perseverance, changeability, and uncertainty. Each of these aspects are examined more closely below, to determine what an appropriate definition of viability for engineered systems should include.
1) Identity:
The organizational definition of viability requires that the team or the organization retains its members or identity. Obviously, this means that, while a team or an organization may change in response to contextual changes over time, it cannot change too much and still be considered viable. In general, engineered systems may evolve over time and still be considered viable. In fact, evolutionary development is considered to be a key characteristic of SoSs [9] .
2) Independence: According to the VSM, a system must retain its independent existence in order for it to be viable [10] . Independence, however, is subject to interpretation. Most, if not all, systems require certain contextual conditions to exist, and some of these conditions include the presence of, and actions by, certain entities. For example, businesses without clients or customers would not be able to exist and, therefore, would not be viable. The VSM handles this by assuming that adequate resources and services are part of the environment, at least to some extent. A viable system, according to cybernetic management, can handle perturbations in the environment, such as a reduction in available resources, but it cannot be viable if critical resources disappear entirely. If some of these critical resources are in fact other systems, then are the organizations described by the VSM independent? It depends on how independence is defined. In terms of engineered systems, there are ten levels of automation, ranging from a "dumb" Level-1 system, where the human does all the decisions and actions, to a fully automated Level-10 system, which has no human in the loop whatsoever [11] . The fact that Level-1 engineered systems exist and provide acceptable value to stakeholders shows that engineered systems can be viable without being independent. For this reason, independence of components will not be a requirement for viability of an engineered system.
3) Self-Preservation: For the biological and natural-based systems, self-preservation is a key component of viability. The entities, or systems, must be able to handle contextual changes themselves, in order for those entities or systems to be considered viable. This is because there is no separation, physical or otherwise, between stakeholder and entity; they are one and the same. If the entity ceases to exist, the stakeholders cease to exist as well. While certain engineered systems, particularly sociotechnical systems, may include stakeholders as components, many engineered systems are completely separate from the stakeholders and only exist to provide value. If the engineered system fails to provide value, then that system may cease to exist, but that does not necessarily mean that the stakeholders have to cease to exist as well. This is important to realize since the stakeholders may make decisions about their system that is in the best interest of the stakeholders, not necessarily in the interest of the system's viability. 4) Changeability: Being able to change, which is known as changeability [12] , is another requirement for a system to be viable. According to the VSM, a viable system has the ability to change, or adapt, in response to changes in the environment. For a complex AV like a Global Hawk, which is expected to take part in numerous different missions, in dynamic environments, within and without an SoS, it is hard to imagine it being viable without the ability to adapt in some way to meet emerging technological and social changes. However, for simpler engineered systems such as a home stereo, it is reasonable to expect the context to remain fairly static. Thus, the requirement for change or adaption is not necessary for viability in engineered systems.
5) Uncertainty:
When discussing the viability of a fetus, there is always some uncertainty about the fetus itself, e.g., whether or not all of its organs are fully functional, as well as some uncertainty about the environment in which the baby will be exposed, e.g., whether it will be exposed to measles, mumps, and other infectious diseases. Similarly, the capabilities and behavior of complex systems are not always well understood, particularly SoSs, and there is almost always uncertainty in the contexts in which they operate. The uncertainty in both the engineered system itself and its context can make it necessary to describe viability as a likelihood, where the stochastic nature of both the system and its context is taken into consideration.
A system can be viable, even in a context where there are threats and perturbations that it may not be able to survive, as long as the stakeholders are willing to accept the risk. For example, an AV could be considered viable, even if it could be destroyed by a nuclear missile, as long as the stakeholders are willing to exclude nuclear missiles from the list of contextual perturbations being considered. The Ford Pinto fuel tank controversy [13] is an infamous case where Ford executives were accused of approving a flawed design, after performing a cost-benefit analysis that included legal damages resulting from deaths. This type of risk taking may also highlight the fact that viability of a mass-produced system, such as a car or a cell phone, is likely to be different than the viability of a massive unique SoS such as the Next Generation Air Transportation System due to the risks of failure. In mass-produced systems, a certain number of systems are often expected to fail, with relatively small consequence. In larger, particularly unique systems, failure of a system is catastrophic to its stakeholders.
II. VIABILITY FOR ENGINEERED SYSTEMS
Based on the analysis of the concept of viability found in the technical and nontechnical literature (see Section I-A), we define viability for engineered systems as the current likelihood that an engineered system will provide acceptable value to its stakeholders, over its life era. The "life era" is both the expected time the system needs to last and a sequence of epochs (pairs of contexts and needs) that it is expected to encounter (known as the "system era"). What constitutes the life era is a prediction made by the stakeholders at the time viability is assessed. At the design stage, the life era may be determined to be a particular set of epochs, but as the system is implemented and exists, its life era (or what is left of it) may start to change, as the context and/or stakeholder needs change. As a result, the viability of a system may change as the system or context changes. Although this research does not attempt to define metrics for viability, an engineered system can be more or less viable than another system, or to itself if something changes, since viability is a likelihood. The more likely that an engineered system will provide acceptable value to its stakeholders over its life era, the more viable it is. Viability can be enabled by something, if that something increases the likelihood that a system will provide value to its stakeholders over its life era.
III. CHANGE-RELATED "-ILITIES"
For most engineered systems, viability will be contingent on the ability to survive contextual change of some sort. There has been a considerable amount of research done at determining qualities that may help systems maintain value delivery in spite of change, [14] , including reliability [15] , security [16] , safety [17] , survivability [18] , resilience [19] - [21] , versatility [22] , and robustness [23] . While the usefulness of these variousilities has been established, many of them are similar and possibly redundant. Does a viable system need any or all of these -ilities? How is resilience different from survivability? Is reliability necessary to achieve robustness? To answer these questions, this section compares the similarities, differences, and gaps in some of the more common -ilities in the literature to determine the quality or qualities that a system needs to possess to be viable. Table I provides definitions of some of the changerelated -ilities found in the literature. Many of these -ilities are specific to how a system changes, e.g., quickly (agility) or by specific entities (e.g., flexibility and adaptability). However, it has already been determined that viable systems do not have to change, in certain circumstances. Thus, while these changerelated -ilities may help certain engineered systems to be viable, they are not necessary for all engineered systems. However, some of the change-related -ilities are defined in such ways as to suggest particular perseverance or resistance to change over a period of time that may be synonymous with viability. These -ilities are discussed below.
A. Resilience
Out of all of the -ilities, the term "resilience" is probably used the most often to describe how a system maintains stakeholder value over time. The Oxford dictionary [24] defines resilience as "the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties" and "the ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape." Unfortunately, the definition of resilience varies widely in the engineering literature. Sheard and Mostashari [25] listed 35 different definitions of resilience, highlighting the fact that they mainly differ along five dimensions: 1) the period of time over which the perturbation occurs; 2) the type of system; 3) the events that occur; 4) the actions the system must take; and 5) the qualities that the system is trying to preserve. There is no consensus in the literature as to what a "resilient" system actually is, as, for example, certain definitions might require that a system change (or at least have the ability to change), whereas other definitions explicitly require that the system stays the same when everything else changes. Due to the ambiguity of the definition, it is not advised to require that a system be resilient without explicitly stating exactly what that entails.
B. Reliability
The IEEE [26] defines "reliability" as the ability of a system or a component to perform its required functions under stated conditions (i.e., context and needs) for a specified period of time. Reliability ensures that the system itself does not change over time in such a way that it can no longer provide stakeholder value. Reliability is necessary for engineered systems to provide value to stakeholders over its expected lifetime; however, it is not sufficient if those systems are subject to contextual perturbations outside what should be expected. For example, an AV would be considered unreliable if all the power supplies fail and the AV cannot operate. It would be also considered unreliable if the communication system failed because rain interfered with the signal propagation through the air. If, however, the AV failed because it was shot down by an enemy missile, then the AV would not be considered unreliable. To enemy attacks and other unusual perturbations, other -ilities, such as survivability and robustness, need to be examined.
C. Survivability
Ellison et al. [27] has defined survivability as "the capability of the system to achieve its requirements or goals, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures or accidents." Richards [28] has defined survivability as "the ability of systems to minimize the impact of finite-duration, contextual changes on value delivery," and introduced two new survivability metrics: time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability. Typically, there are three ways systems can achieve survivability [19] : 1) reducing the probability that a disturbance will impact the system; 2) reducing the amount of value lost directly as a result of a disturbance occurring; and 3) increasing the system's ability to make a timely recovery from a disturbance, which is known as system resilience. The three ways to achieve survivability are also referred to as Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III survivability, respectively [18] . Jackson [21] referred to the same concepts as those of Richards, but used the term resilience instead of "survivability." 1 It is important to note that survivability is relative to a specific event or a set of conditions. We can say that an engineered system is (or is not) survivable to X, where X may be some unusual event such as a thunderstorm, collision, or hacker attacks. It is not meaningful to say that a system is survivable (in general), mostly because it is impossible to enumerate all possible disturbances a system may encounter during its lifespan.
D. Robustness
Robustness is another quality that is closely related to survivability. The Oxford dictionary [29] defines robustness of a system or an organization as "being able to withstand or overcome adverse conditions," but like the term resilience, there are several different definitions in the technical literature. The "Taguchi" method, popular in industrial engineering for increasing product quality, defines a robust design as one that delivers a strong "signal" regardless of external or internal "noise" [30] . The concept of signal and noise relates to what the design is trying to do (the signal) and external and internal disturbances that interfere with that (noise). During a workshop on systems engineering, Ross et al. [12] noted that Dr. Marvin Sambur, then Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, defined system "robustness" as being adaptable, scalable, reliable, sustainable, and easily modifiable, which is somewhat ambiguous. For example, what does "easily modifiable" mean? Does it mean that it is "easy" to modify because it is inexpensive, or is it easily modifiable because changes do not require much time or effort? Are changes that have to be made by external entities still considered easy, or do the changes have to be endogenous?
Beesemeyer [31] clarified the definition of robustness, while distinguishing it from similarly defined -ilities. According to Beesemeyer, a system is something (e.g., form) and does something (e.g., function), which can be described by a set of system parameters and outcome parameters, respectively. For example, an AV can be described by a set of system parameters, such as the fact that it is 5.4 m long, and output parameters, such as the fact that it can fly at 120 km/h. Robustness can be defined as a system's ability to maintain its output, regardless of changes in the system or context. If an AV could still fly at 150 km/h even if the diesel engine of the AV was replaced with a solar-powered electric motor or if the AV flies into a hurricane, then the AV would be considered (at least partially) robust in air speed to changes in engine technology and weather conditions. Robustness makes no claim about value delivery, and the distinction between output and value is important. If the stakeholders of the AV decide in the future that the AV needs to fly at 200 km/h and the AV cannot do so, then the AV is not valuable (i.e., viable), even if it is still robust. This distinction implies that, while robustness is a useful quality to have, it is not sufficient to ensure that a system will maintain its value delivery over its lifecycle.
E. Value Sustainment
Due to the ambiguity and lack of consensus on terms such as robustness in the literature, Ross and Rhodes [32] defined value robustness as "the ability of a system to continue to deliver stakeholder value in the face of changing contexts and needs," which may be achieved through various related -ilities, such as modifiability, adaptability, scalability, and flexibility. The concept of value robustness is typically used to describe the ability of a system to maintain value delivery in response to variations within considered contexts. These variations are sometimes referred to as "long-term context perturbations." The concept of epoch, which is a time period of fixed context and needs, can be also used to consider exogenous factor variations that might impact a system [33] . Enumerating sets of possible epochs, as well as evaluating system sensitivity to variation in experienced epochs, is another technique for evaluating system robustness. Generalizing this concept, Beesemeyer [31] defined "value sustainment" as the ability to maintain value delivery in spite of long-or short-term contextual perturbations, which include both disturbances and context changes (i.e., epoch shifts).
Value sustainment is the closest -ility that would describe the quality that system architects are looking for; however, it is only useful for situations where there may be contextual changes that the system needs to be able to handle. For most complex systems, such as an AV, this is typically the case. However, there are situations where engineered systems are expected to operate in static contextual conditions and therefore do not need to be value sustainable. For example, an inexpensive stereo is an engineered system that is expected to operate for years in a relatively stable context. If it meets the needs of the buyer initially, then it simply needs to be reliable for the rest of its lifetime. Unless the stereo was very expensive, it is not usually a requirement for it to be changeable, nor survivable to external disturbances such as power surge. If the owner's needs change over time, then he or she will simply replace the stereo. While the case where the context remains static may seem idealistic and not applicable for complex systems, a strategy for ensuring that a system maintains its value may be to place it within an SoS where it can be shielded from external perturbations and therefore operate under a pseudostatic context. For example, a particular AV may not be survivable to missile attacks; however, it could be viable if it is located within an SoS where other SoS components can intercept missiles before they reach the vulnerable AV. This way, the local context of the AV does not include missile attacks, although the overall context for the SoS does.
IV. DESIGNING FOR VIABILITY
If a system architect wishes to design a system that provides value over its entire lifetime in spite of perturbations that may arise, then the system will need to satisfy two criteria. First, the system must survive any inevitable events that threaten the value delivery of the system. Second, the system must prevent terminal events from occurring. A terminal event is any event that the system cannot successfully mitigate or recover from [1] . If the system cannot satisfy both criteria, then it is not viable.
Due to events that are beyond the control of a system or its stakeholders, a viable system will need to be survivable to certain perturbations that arise during its lifetime. This means that the numerous survivability design principles already in existence, such as those of Richards [34] and Jackson [21] , will be also effective viability design principles for relevant systems and disturbances. However, it is possible that a system may not need to be survivable to any perturbations and still be viable, if those perturbations do not occur. A system is fragile to a particular context if its viability is dependent on the context remaining static. A fragile system does not need to be survivable or value robust, since those properties are defined by the ability to maintain value in spite of change. Shielding the system from contextual changes is a strategy for achieving viability [33] , much in the same way a mother shields a newborn from perturbations it cannot survive on its own.
V. SYSTEM CHANGE AS A DISTURBANCE
For systems that cannot be shielded from contextual perturbations, researchers have studied designing latent capabilities that grant a system the ability to change. Examples of changerelated -ilities include changing at a later date [35] , changing during operational phases [36] , changing easily/rapidly [37] , and changing in size [38] , as shown in Table I [39] . Researchers have shown that change-related -ilities are desirable properties to have, but is changeability always a good thing? Does making a system more changeable improve its ability to deliver value to its stakeholders? Can changeability actually decrease value delivery to stakeholders and become a vulnerability?
A. Dispatch Failure
One of the most well-known examples of an endogenous change gone wrong [40] leads credence to the popular saying "If it isn't broke, don't try to fix it." The London Ambulance System (LAS) is the largest free-to-patient ambulance service in the U.K., responding to over 1.5 million calls a year in the London area. On October 29, 1992, a new computer-aided dispatch (CAD) was introduced into the existing ambulance network to optimize ambulance allocation and reduce wait times. Overloaded with calls and working with imperfect information, the new CAD failed, and the LAS was unable to respond to emergency calls and send ambulances in a timely manner. As a result, the LAS was blamed by the media for as many as 30 deaths [41] . After only a few days in service, the CAD was removed. According to the official report, there were numerous problems that led to the LAS failure that occurred, including organizational resistance (i.e., some ambulance operators were deliberately ignoring the new operating procedure) and project management. A fundamental problem, however, was that the new software caused an unnecessary bottleneck, by making some wrong assumptions about how the existing system operated.
B. Cluster
Another infamous example of endogenous change failure occurred in 1996 when the Ariane 5 rocket failed to achieve orbit, losing the European Space Agency Cluster spacecraft it was carrying. This $370 million [42] accident occurred because of a bug in a particular software component that caused a hardware failure elsewhere in the system. As Nuseibeh [43] explained, the real problem was that there was a risk in one of the components that increased as requirements were changed. Although there was a threat, the original design was viable because the stakeholders accepted the risk of not handling a certain software exception. However, as the system changed to meet new requirements, that particular risk increased. Project managers failed to realize this change in risk, however, and ended up reusing the old code within the new design, with disastrous results.
For both the LAS and Cluster failures, voluntary endogenous changes that were made to improve value delivery actually ended up doing the opposite. Clearly, a changeable system may be desirable as research has shown, but is it always better than a nonchangeable system? What changes should and should not be allowed? To answer these questions, we next define what constitutes a system change.
VI. SA AND CHANGE
Changes can be described in many dimensions, including the time it takes to make the change, the cost of the change, the complexity of the change, the location of the agent performing the change (i.e., exogenous or endogenous to the system), and whether the change was intended or not. Ideally, an intentional change should have predictable consequences. However, many changes, particularly those performed on complex systems such as an AV, will have unintended consequences as well. Predicting all of the effects that an endogenous change has on the system itself often requires an in-depth understanding of the system architecture (SA).
The Department of Defense defined SA as a framework or a structure that portrays relationships among all the elements of the system [44]. Crawley et al. [45] defined SA as the description of the components of a system and the relationships between them. In this sense, the SA includes both what the system is composed of and how these components work together. At a minimum, the SA should describe the functional behavior of the system, i.e., which tasks the components perform, as well as when and how the tasks are executed, similar to the Capability and Operational Views found in the Department of Defense Architectural Framework 2.0 [46] . We define components to be what a system is supposed to be made up of and Concept of Operations (CONOPs) as what a system is supposed to do. The components of a system include all of the possible entities that make up the system, whereas the CONOPs describe how those entities interact with each other and the environment to deliver value to the stakeholders. Together, the components and the CONOPs of a system describe the system's architecture. Although a system's components and CONOPs can be independently changed, often, a change in one requires a change in the other. A change in either components or CONOPs means that the system itself has changed.
For simple systems, the emergent behavior of the system is often predictable from the SA, through aggregating the functional behaviors of the components. For more complex systems, emergent behavior is more difficult to predict, and the primary technical role and responsibility of a system architect is to ensure that the interconnections of the components achieve the necessary "system functions" to meet the overall purpose [9] .
A simple approach to change would be to categorize them as being either intentional or unintentional, depending upon whether the decision makers in charge of the system made the decision to change or not. Intentional changes are often in response to a shift in context or stakeholder needs and are typically the types of changes described by researchers when they discuss changeability, flexibility, agility, and other types of change-related system properties. Unintentional, or "imposed," changes are those that the system is "forced" to undergo, that is, changes that occur whether the decision makers want them to or not. Some unintentional changes spontaneously occur, such as when a collision physically alters the structure of a system that has been impacted, whereas others are unintentional endogenous changes that are in response to an exogenous disturbance. Other unintentional changes happen after decision makers authorized them, but only because they have to, in response to some other event beyond their control. A labor strike may shut down an AV, or a new regulation may require that the AV incorporate new sense-and-avoid technology.
Much of the work in resilience engineering is really about making sure that a system resists certain unintentional changes. However, the concept of "intentional" changes should be clarified further than has traditionally been the case. Sometimes, decision makers may want to implement a change to improve value delivery but end up reducing it instead. This is because, as the system complexity grows, and as more changes are made to the system, it becomes increasingly difficult to verify and validate the effects those changes will have. Sometimes, the original architects and engineers who designed the system and really understood how it works may no longer be available to evaluate impacts of planned changes. Subtle assumptions that were not made explicit may be violated with new changes and could prove to be not only disastrous but also difficult to find until it is too late. The larger and more complex a system is, the more likely this will be the case. This is particularly a problem with SoSs that have autonomous constituent systems with emergent behavior that is difficult to model. The larger the system, or the more expensive, or the more stakeholders involved, the likelihood decreases of someone wanting to accept responsibility for any one particular change. Thus, there may be a substantial bureaucratic process involved for any complex system that makes it extremely time consuming and costly for all but trivial changes to be made. This "red tape" can seriously impair the ability of the system to quickly respond to changes in context, particularly if it takes years to approve any significant changes.
VII. CHANGE WITHIN AND BETWEEN ARCHITECTURES
To help determine whether a change might threaten the value delivery of a system requires understanding how systems can transition within and between SAs. This requires defining the concept of an architectural instance. A typical SA will have fixed and variable system parameters in the components, CONOPs, or both. The fixed system parameters differentiate one architecture from another, whereas the variable system parameters differentiate one architectural instance from another. A design is a specific set of components (known as its form) and specific CONOPs (known as its mode of operation) that belongs to an SA. Thus
where D ij is the design consisting of the ith form specified in the set of components and the jth mode of operations specified in the set of CONOPs of some particular SA. A design is conceptual, and it only exists as an idea. However, a system is an actual physical realization of a design that provides value to stakeholders. A design is an instance of an architecture, and a system is an instance of a design. To illustrate the differences between various SAs and designs, consider designing an AV to conduct surveillance missions. In reality, there will be numerous parameters to specify, but for illustrative purposes, only the following four binary parameters are relevant: 1) rotary or fixed wing type (form); 2) electrooptical or infrared payload (form); 3) sense and avoid (S&A) technology enabled or not (form); 4) solo or SoS flying formation (mode of operation). 
A. Feasible and Viable Designs

VIII. PLIABILITY
Pliability is the property of a system to be able to switch to other viable instances, which are specified by the architecture's pliable set. The pliable set is the set of allowable designs that adhere to the architecture, have been validated (by whatever means the architect desires) to deliver acceptable stakeholder value, and are connected (i.e., can transition to or be transitioned from another viable instance within the SA). If an SA has multiple allowable designs, then a system is always an instance of one of these designs at any time t, and can transition to the other instances defined in the pliable set of its SA, while remaining the same system. If a system transitions to an instance outside of its SA, then it becomes an unapproved system. Whether this new system will be viable or not is unknown (at best), since it does not belong to the set of viable instances, which is defined by the architects responsible for its value delivery. Thus, it is usually in the best interest of the architects and decision makers to not let systems change into instances outside of their SA.
A. Pliable Transitions
A system's ability to transition to other systems is referred to as system changeability [33] . Changeability is affected by a number of factors, including stakeholder support and cost. An allowable transition is one where the switch from one design to another is allowed by the system architects. There are a number of reasons why a system transition may not be allowed by the system architects. The question of whether system architects would allow a transition would likely depend on the answer to the following questions: Is there enough time to transition? Is the cost of transition worth it? Does it matter if none of the original components are used in the final design (i.e., they all get removed or replaced at some stage in the transition)? Does it matter whether or not the intermediate stages between the original stage and the final stage are still viable systems themselves?
Although there are eight viable designs in the AV example above, not all designs may be reachable from all other designs. Determining which designs are reachable from other designs is how the system architects define the pliable sets and the SAs. Suppose there are two constraints on transitioning between designs. The first constraint is that the choice of wing type is fixed, meaning that a fixed-wing system (D FX ) cannot be transformed into a rotary-wing design (D RX ) and vice-versa. The second constraint is that, while the S&A technology can be added at any time to a design, the installation is irreversible, meaning that the transition is one way only (from no S&A to having S&A).
Seeing as there are no constraints on transitioning between the two payloads or between the flying formations (other than the fact that SoS flying requires an S&A to be installed), the constraints divide the designs into two SAs (defined by the wing type) and three pliable sets, as shown in Fig. 1 . These are pliable set
, and pliable set III = (D R4 , D R8 ). Pliable sets I and II belong to one SA (the fixed-wing architecture), whereas pliable set III belongs to the other SA (the rotary-wing architecture).
B. Nonpliable Transitions
If a system changes in ways allowed by its SA, then this is a pliable change and something that is allowed, if the context change requires it. This is one of the main attractions of having a pliable system. However, if the new instance is not allowed by the SA, then this change can be considered a "hack." Sometimes hacks work, such as when users "jailbreak" their Apple iPhone 4S to run on unauthorized networks. Other times, the hacks fail, due to the complexity of the system and the fact that the changes were never considered or approved by those who were responsible for building the system in the first place. In some cases, nonpliable changes can result in a system that becomes a design of a different SA, if such an architecture is already defined or requires a new SA to be defined. This is a more serious change that often requires stakeholder approval and input from system architects. If the new SA is validated by the system architects, then, like pliability, this type of transition is a special case of changeability known as evolvability [47] .
Another type of system transition is degradation. This type of transition is when the system changes in a way that deviates from any design within the SA and fails to provide value accordingly. For example, losing the diesel engine would result in a degradation, since all designs require it. For the system to return to viability, it would need to replace the diesel engine and restore the system or transition to some other design that is also viable but belongs to a different SA. Fig. 2 shows the types of transitions discussed here, where D AX and D BX are designs of validated systems architectures A and B, respectively; and D α X is a design of an architecture that has not yet been validated.
IX. PLIABILITY AND VIABLE SYSTEMS
Viability requires the effective handling of change within systems, either by preventing, mitigating, or recovering from unwanted change caused by perturbations or intentionally changing in response to new contexts. By requiring that systems be pliable, viability can be increased in three different ways: 1) by placing constraints on transitions so that stakeholders do not decide to change the system into something that is not viable; 2) by introducing viable instances that stakeholders may not have considered, so that system can transition if needed; and 3) by prevalidating change options to reduce the time and effort required for stakeholders to approve changes, allowing them to be implemented quicker and easier. The reason why pliable set I is distinct from pliable set II is because certain designs in II can never reach certain designs in I, due to the S&A installation constraint. This is important because it means that the designs in pliable set II have less viable designs to transition to, in the vent of a contextual change. Thus, the viability of a particular design is not only dependent on how well that design delivers value to its stakeholders but also on whether or not that design can transition to another viable design, if needed.
X. RESILIENCE OF PLIABLE SYSTEMS
Disturbances may break the architecture of a particular system by altering one of the fixed parameters or by forcing a parameter to go outside its pliable range. Since the system was not designed to operate outside of its architecture, there is a risk that the disturbance will not be survivable if the new architecture nonconforming instance is not viable. In this situation, the system needs to either return to its original architecture, through repair or replacement, or adapt to a new viable SA. In other cases, disturbances may not break an SA but instead change the context in such a way that the system will not survive unless it adapts to a new viable SA (see Table III ).
XI. PLIABILITY STRATEGIES FOR ENABLING VIABILITY
Using the concept of pliability, several new strategies for viability can be developed (see Fig. 3 ). The strategies are Reversion, Stable Intermediate Instances, and Contingency. These strategies attempt to reduce the risk associated with making a large transition, by being able to transition into viable instances that are not necessarily the instances to which the system was intending to transition.
A. Strategy of Stable Intermediate Instances
This strategy is transitioning to a less risky instance within the pliable set, before attempting to transition to a higher risk instance, in case the system never makes the full transition. This strategy is often used with Reversion. For example, suppose stakeholders of an AV described in Section VII that was fixed wing with no S&A technology wanted to go beyond the pliable set and include the ability to carry dangerous cargo, as well as incorporating S&A technology. Both of these changes are irreversible; thus, reversion to the original instance is not possible. Instead of directly transitioning to an invalidated design by adding the cargo capacity first, a better strategy might be to first transition to a stable design by incorporating the S&A before the cargo. This way, the stakeholders have another chance to decide if the final version is really what they want before making the irreversible addition. If the context is dynamic, it is possible that the stakeholders may not want or need to transition outside the SA, and the stable intermediate instance may be good enough.
B. Strategy of Contingency
Sometimes, it is not practical or even possible to build a stable intermediate instance before transitioning to a final design. Contingency is when there is a stable design that can be reached from the final design that the system can transition to in the event that it needs to (i.e., a "fallback" option).
XII. PLIABILITY AND OTHER CHANGE-RELATED -ILITIES
At first glance, pliability may seem to be the same as some other -ilities already in use, such as "flexibility," "modifiability," or "adaptability." The following is a description of how pliability is related to, but distinct from, the other -ilities as defined in Table I .
A. Value Robustness
Pliability is only concerned with changes in the system, as well as whether such changes are allowed under the SA. Implicit in the specification of "allowable under the SA" is the concept of value robustness. Pliable systems that undergo an allowable transition will retain value robustness for contexts that were considered in the design of the SA. Pliability does not guarantee value robustness in contexts that were not considered in the design of the SA, regardless of whether the system transition was allowable or not.
B. Robustness
A pliable system may be robust if it does not need to transition to a new instance to provide value under a new context. Likewise, robustness can be achieved by transitioning to a new instance within the pliable set as a response to perturbations to maintain outcome parameters. Pliability provides the system with the option to change, but does not require it to.
C. Modifiability
Pliability requires either modifiability or scalability, i.e., the parameter can change in some way. However, a system may be modifiable in a parameter beyond what is included in the pliable range.
D. Changeability
A system must be changeable to be pliable, but does not have to be pliable to be changeable. Pliability requires not only that the transition to a new system is possible (i.e., the system is changeable) but also that the new system is part of the same SA (not needed for changeability). This way, changeability is more general than pliability.
E. Adaptability
Pliable systems need to be changeable, but they do not need to be changeable by an internal change agent. A system that is changeable only by an external agent can be also pliable.
F. Flexibility
Pliable systems need to be changeable, but they do not need to be changeable by an external change agent (an internal change agent will do), nor does the agent need intent. Pliable systems can transition to other systems by accident (e.g., as the result of a disturbance). In fact, one of the main goals of having a pliable system is that if a disturbance does impose an involuntary transition, the transition will be more likely to result in a system still within the SA.
G. Evolvability
A system that transitions to another instance within its SA is demonstrating pliability, not evolvability. Evolvability requires changes in a system with inheritance during "redesign." This may correspond to changes in an inherited SA.
H. Agility
Pliability does not explicitly require timely changes, just as long as the transition "is possible." If stakeholders are not concerned with timeliness, then timeliness is not a factor in the pliability of the system. However, pliability may enable agility by reducing "red tape" for change.
I. Scalability
Pliability requires either modifiability or scalability, i.e., the parameter can change in some way. However, a system may be scalable in a parameter beyond what is included in the pliable range.
J. Reconfigurability
Reconfigurability is a specific change in CONOPs (one that changes the relationships between the operational elements). This change may or may not be in the pliable range; hence, a system may be pliable and reconfigurable, pliable only (if the allowable changes do not include CONOPs changes concerning component relationships), or reconfigurable only (if the CONOPs changes are not part of the pliable range).
K. Extensibility
Assuming that "new features" are features not included in the original design (i.e., SA), then extensibility and pliability are independent properties. For example, an AV can be both extensible and pliable. Performing an authorized upgrade from standard definition video payloads to high-definition video payloads is an example of pliability, if both payloads are part of the SA for that AV. Adding third-party peripherals or software that is not part of the SA is extensibility. An example would be if an additional communications relay payload was added to an AV that did not include that feature as part of its SA. Like any other change, adding features to a system may violate the architecture, if it causes a parameter to change outside its pliable range (e.g., "power supply needed"). Architects should try to safeguard the parameters of their system architecture when designing for extensibility.
L. Interoperability
Not directly related to pliability, but an SA that supports interoperability will likely require a larger pliable set than a similar architecture that does not, particularly if the system is taking a defensive posture (proposed Type-I survivability design principle). This is because the range of what the system may need to accommodate will likely be larger than what would be needed if the interfaces were custom.
M. Survivability
Systems that are more pliable will be more survivable, due to the fact that there are validated system changes available should stakeholders need to change in response to a disturbance (Type-II survivability). Systems may be also more survivable due to an increase in the likelihood that an involuntary change brought about by a disturbance will still transition into one of the validated instances of the SA (Type-II survivability).
N. Versatility
Pliability allows change in form and/or mode of operations. A system may be versatile and pliable if it changes CONOPs (only), within the pliable range, to satisfy diverse needs.
XIII. CONCLUSION
When complex engineered systems are expected to provide value to stakeholders over long periods of time and under hostile or dynamic contexts, they need to be more than just feasible-they need to be viable. In this paper, viability for engineered systems has been defined and differentiated from other similar existing -ilities. In order for an engineered system to be viable, it must be able to avoid perturbations that it cannot survive and survive perturbations it cannot avoid. While many of the existing survivability strategies are still effective at enabling viability, different strategies emerge as a result of this new construct. For example, an effective viability strategy for avoiding contextual perturbations is to keep the system's local context constant by shielding the system from the real context in which it operates. This can be done in SoSs where the local context of constituent systems is still within the overall SoS.
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